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This research, based on stakeholder theory and the national 
cultural dimensions, aims to test the influence of foreigners on 
board and its size on Integrated Reporting (IR) practices. The 
analysis is based on a sample of 1,058 European companies from 
18 different countries, who adopted or not the IR for the year 
2015, and it relies on a Logit. The dependent variable is a dummy 
(presenting or not the IR) and the independent variables are 
represented by the board characteristics (foreigners and size). The 
impact of the critical mass on the presence of foreigners and the 
cultural dimension on the basis of directors’ nationality was 
tested relying on the masculinity/femininity dimension of 
Hofstede. Besides, the directors’ country of origin was considered, 
namely if they belong to the major European countries presenting 
a wider IR diffusion. The relationship between foreigners on board 
and IR is found to be negative. This means that companies with at 
least one foreigner are less inclined to adopt IR. The results show 
that the boards with more of three foreign administrators have a 
major propensity to adopt the IR. The membership of the directors 
in countries with a feminist culture also has a positive effect. 
 
Keywords: Stakeholder Theory, Integrated Reporting, Board 
Diversity, Foreigners, Cultural Dimensions, Logit 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
According to the International Integrated Reporting 
Council – IIRC (2013), IR provides a fuller picture of 
a company’s ability to create value than the 
traditional reporting model, as it communicates the 
range of resources and relationships – the financial, 
manufactured, intellectual, human, social and 
relationship, and natural capitals – that are used and 
affected by an organization, and explains how it 
interacts with them. It thus ensures the connectivity 
of information needed to assess the organization’s 
strategy and business model over the long term, 
respond to the legitimate needs and interests of 
investors and other stakeholders, and allocate 
capital more efficiently and productively. 
Thus, the IR framework calls for a single report 
giving complete, clear financial and non-financial 
information to inform stakeholders of company 
performance and prospects. 
This single IR report aims to replace the earlier 
dominant practice of separating financial and 
sustainability information (Lozano & Huisingh, 2011; 
Jensen & Berg, 2012; IIRC, 2013; Incollingo & Bianchi, 
2016; Montemari & Chiucchi, 2017). 
The IIRC (2013) considers that integrating 
financial and sustainability disclosures will better 
satisfy investors’ need for information by providing 
a complete picture of a company and its 
performance. The IIRC (2011) describes an IR as 
“bringing together material information about an 
organization’s strategy, governance, performance 
and prospects in a way that reflects the commercial, 
social and environmental context within which it 
operates”. Combining sustainability and financial 
information into a single document could overcome 
a potential disconnect in the way investment 
professionals handle the two types of information 
(Arnold et al., 2012) by supporting “integrated 
thinking” as advocated by the IIRC. 
IR’s objectives include completeness and 
reliability in providing all material information, thus 
going beyond the purely economic and financial 
dimension traditionally reported in the financial 
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statements. Eccles and Krzus (2010a) identify two 
main reasons for companies to implement IR; the 
first is that IR is a key element for sustainability, by 
means of a strategy which manages the risks and 
opportunities of a sustainable society, while the 
second is that it increases the transparency of 
corporate disclosure by conveying a simplified 
message for all stakeholders in the form of just one 
report. 
Eccles and Krzus (2010b) describe four 
potential benefits of presenting an IR: 
 Greater clarity about relationships and 
commitments; 
 Better decisions; 
 Deeper engagement with all stakeholders; 
 Lower reputational risk. As social 
responsibility and sustainability have taken on an 
important role, managing reputational risks and the 
difficulty of doing so have also increased in 
importance. 
Though IR provides more information than 
traditional financial reporting, it is currently 
voluntary. One justification for adopting it comes 
from stakeholder theory, which holds that 
organizations should create wealth for all 
stakeholders, rather than creating value only for the 
shareholders (Gonzàlez Esteban, 2007). 
Furthermore, stakeholder theory suggests that 
diversity in board composition can be seen as a 
crucial indicator of a firm’s CSR and as a sign of a 
stakeholder-oriented firm. 
The board of directors is designated by the 
shareholders to manage the firm’s business (Monks 
& Minow, 2008), and is thus the primary means of 
governance. As such, it plays a crucial role in 
ensuring that management acts in the shareholders’ 
interests (Brennan, 2006). An important part of this 
monitoring function consists of seeing that 
management’s voluntary disclosures are reliable 
rather than self-serving (Healy & Palepu, 2001), so 
the firm will be able over time to establish a sound 
corporate disclosure system (Qu & Leung, 2006). 
However, whether the board can monitor 
management effectively, and thus determine the 
quality of voluntary disclosure, also depends on its 
composition (Mizruchi, 2004; Brick et al., 2006). 
Board composition can vary in terms of value 
system, gender, board size, industry background 
and nationality (Van der Walt et al., 2006; Kang et al., 
2007; Alfiero et al., 2017). 
In particular, board members’ national diversity 
and national culture can influence the board’s 
financial reporting choices (Hope, 2003). 
Although various studies propose measures of 
national culture (House et al., 2004), Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions (1980, 1983, 2001) are the 
constructs most widely used by researchers. One of 
these dimensions is a society’s masculinity/femininity, 
which is the degree to which masculine values such 
as ambition, power, and materialism prevail over 
feminine values such as quality of life and emphasis 
on personal relationships. 
This study focuses only on the 
masculinity/femininity dimension, rather than the 
other aspects of board members’ personality and 
culture for two reasons. First, this cultural 
dimension has been one of the most important 
issues in previous research on corporate disclosure 
(Orij, 2010; Gallen & Peraita, 2017). Second, national 
diversity on the board is believed to be a major 
factor in the dissemination of IR (Jensen & Berg, 
2012). This cultural variable can help make sense of 
the corporate disclosure decision-making process. 
International board composition is rarely 
investigated, but Heidrick and Struggles (2014) 
found that the percentage of non-national directors 
on European boards increased from 11% to 23% 
between 2007 and 2009, while empirical research 
shows that the trend towards globalization is 
expected to increase national diversity. 
The association between the proportion of 
foreign nationals and disclosures in earlier literature 
raises the issue of cause and effect, which was also 
considered by Fields and Keys (2003), who 
investigated the impact of the variety of experience, 
ideas and innovations brought by individuals on 
company performance. 
Non-national directors are assumed to be from 
developed countries that devote considerable 
attention to social and environmental issues. It is 
thus believed that such directors can transfer this 
kind of attention to firms in developing countries. 
In fact, Ayuso and Argandona (2009) maintain 
that foreign directors usually play an important role 
in favouring corporate social reporting strategies. 
Khan (2010) found that voluntary social 
disclosure by Bangladesh banks is significantly 
linked to the proportion of foreign nationals on the 
board. Barako and Brown (2008), on the other hand, 
found a reverse relationship between the proportion 
of foreign nationals on bank boards and the level of 
corporate social reporting by Kenyan banks. 
Thus, the first research question is the following: 
Is there a positive relationship between IR and board 
size (RQ1/H1) and the presence of foreign board 
members (RQ1/H2)? 
The second research question is the following: Is 
IR adoption affected by the number (critical mass – 
RQ2/H1) and cultural background (masculinity versus 
femininity – RQ2/H2) of foreign board members? 
Whereas previous research focused on 
analysing the effects of adopting IR, our study shifts 
attention further upstream, seeking to determine 
whether certain board features influence the 
decision to adopt IR. To the best of our knowledge, 
it is the first study of its kind and is also original in 
that the presence of foreigners on the board of 
directors is analysed from a different perspective 
and in greater detail than in previous studies. In fact, 
the ability of foreign board members to influence the 
adoption of IR in different countries is considered in 
“cultural” terms, applying critical mass theory. 
A better understanding of the factors that 
influence the decision to adopt IR is essential for 
academics, companies and policy-makers. 
In the following pages, we will first review the 
theoretical background for the study. This will be 
followed by a presentation of the data, methodology 
and findings, which will then be discussed and 
summarized in the conclusion. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
IR can be considered an evolution of sustainability 
reporting. It can provide all types of for-profit or 
non-profit organizations with an opportunity to 
enhance transparency, governance and decision-
making (Eccles & Krzus, 2010a; Adams et al., 2011; 
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Dumay et al., 2016). Sourcing and later publishing 
more information has decidedly positive effects on 
decision-making processes in a company, as well as 
with investors and all stakeholders in general. It 
should provide a more concise, balanced picture of 
the company’s performance (Eccles & Krzus, 2010b). 
The IR framework was created to build 
legitimacy and trust among a set of stakeholders 
(Guthrie & Parker, 1990) whose differing cultural 
conditions give rise to different expectations for 
corporate behaviour which are shaped by the values, 
norms and practices reigning in their specific society 
(Carroll, 1979; Bustamante, 2011; Akhtaruddin & 
Rouf, 2012). The framework thus reflects the 
emergence of different business practices for 
information disclosure (Fernández-Feijoo et al., 
2011; Horrach & Salvá, 2011). 
However, there is little academic literature on 
the subject, and empirical research is still minimal. 
One of the most significant supporters of IR is 
Eccles, who analysed the issue in 2010. His basic 
idea is that this new information tool could promote 
a change in company culture. This idea has been 
investigated in studies of the similarities and 
differences between companies that draw up 
sustainability reports and those that publish IRs 
(Jensen & Berg, 2012). 
In 2013, Owen looked into the origins and later 
developments of IR, while other scholars (e.g., Cheng 
et al., 2014) analysed key issues of the IIRC’s 
Consultation Draft of the Framework. Flower (2015) 
is one of the framework’s harshest critics, arguing 
that the IIRC erred in placing no obligation on firms 
to report harm inflicted on outside entities unless 
there is a subsequent impact on the firm. IR has also 
been criticized by Brown and Dillard (2014), who 
maintain that it is limited or biased. 
In a thorough and very interesting review, De 
Villiers et al. (2014) discussed how reporting can be 
interpreted and applied in different ways. 
Stubbs and Higgins (2012) investigated internal 
mechanisms adopted in reporting processes in order 
to determine if IR stimulated better disclosure 
procedures. An interesting study carried out in the 
Netherlands (Van Bommel, 2014) found that the IR 
tool was able to enhance different values. Haller and 
van Staden (2014) emphasized the importance of 
giving information concerning the value created by 
the company and how it is distributed among all 
stakeholders. 
The factors which can affect IR practices have 
also been investigated. Frias-Aceituno et al. (2013) 
reported on the influence of the legal system and 
board composition, while García-Sánchez et al. 
(2013) see culture as a fundamental factor. 
D’Este et al. (2012) carried out an interesting 
study of the IR choices made by groups associated 
with specific geographical areas, finding that firms 
with stronger local roots were more likely to have 
higher levels of disclosure. 
All these studies are informed by stakeholder 
theory, which holds that a focus on the concerns of 
stakeholders, who generally include all those who 
have interests in the organization, is necessary in 
order to be competitive (Roy & Goll, 2014). The 
theory is widely used to explain companies’ 
response to stakeholders’ information requirements 
(Van Der Laan Smith et al., 2005; Chen & Roberts, 
2010) and how this creates value for them (Freeman, 
1984), and IR is part of the dialog between firms and 
their stakeholders (Gray et al., 1995). Moreover, the 
theory links the existence of different stakeholders 
who have different perspectives on optimal 
company performance (Deegan, 2002). 
The relationship between corporations and 
their stakeholders was investigated by Van der Laan 
Smith et al. (2005), who found that factors from 
stakeholder theory are also applicable in explaining 
the IR differences between firms from different 
countries. Similarly, Van der Laan Smith et al. (2010) 
argue that stakeholders’ beliefs influence firms’ 
sustainability reporting practices. 
The new form of managerial understanding 
embodied in stakeholder theory hinges on the fact 
that the shareholders’ needs are met by satisfying 
the needs of the other stakeholders (Jones, 1995; 
Foster & Jonker, 2005; Hawkins, 2006; Jamali, 2008; 
Freeman et al., 2010) and not only by maximizing 
profits and value for the shareholders. The firm’s 
general commitment should also consider values 
held by other stakeholders (Longo et al., 2005), and 
includes social and environmental sustainability. 
Other scholars such as Donaldson and Preston 
(1995) and Jones (1995) also found management 
support for this central tenet of stakeholder theory, 
viz., the need to satisfy a wider set of parties, not 
simply the shareholders. That integrity and ethics 
are beneficial for everyone involved in the 
relationship between companies and stakeholders is 
an opinion shared by Vasconcelos et al. (2012). 
The cross-national features of IR practices and 
individuals’ reactions to them introduce a cultural 
dimension affecting stakeholders’ needs. Hofstede’s 
national cultural dimensions model (1980, 1983 and 
2001) helps provide an understanding of the 
influence of different social norms, beliefs and 
cultural settings on stakeholders’ expectations 
(Cormier et al., 2005). Hofstede’s original idea (1980) 
was to use four specific cultural features to 
systematically identify similarities and differences 
among countries: individualism versus collectivism, 
masculinity versus femininity, tolerance versus 
aversion to uncertainty, and power distance. 
Hofstede (1980, 1983, 2001) and, later, Minkov 
(2007), treat culture as a group-level construct, 
applying it to groups such as nations or 
corporations. Scholars such as Gray (1988) and 
Radebaugh (2014) have investigated the impact of 
national cultural dimensions on accounting 
practices, while others have considered cultural 
influences on particular types of report (Langlois & 
Schlegelmich, 1990; Salter & Niswander, 1995; Neu et 
al., 1998; Adams & Kuasirikun, 2000; Fernández-
Feijoo et al., 2011) or on CSR disclosure practices 
(Van der Laan Smith et al., 2005; Orij, 2010). 
The present study considers only one of 
Hofstede’s dimensions, that of masculinity/femininity. 
This is because of the masculine orientation towards 
quantitatively and economically measurable success 
and the feminine focus on the more qualitative 
aspects of life. Thus, firms that value collectivism, 
tolerance and eschewing gender discrimination will 
be more committed to governance, sustainability 
and transparency. In other words, they will be more 
likely to adopt IR and enhanced disclosure. 
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Accordingly, the study considered the national 
cultural systems, with special reference to their 
masculinity/femininity dimension, because of its 
effect on the basic values held by the public and 
firms (Vitell et al., 2003) and its major impact on the 
ethics of decision-making processes (Singhapakdi et 
al., 1994; Su, 2006). It also influences organizational 
structure and performance by encouraging the 
adoption of sustainable entrepreneurial behaviour 
(Richardson & Boyd, 2005). 
An extensive literature has addressed the 
relationship between disclosure practices and 
corporate governance structures, the board of 
directors in particular (Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Adams, 2002; Eng & Mak, 2003; Ricart et al., 2005; 
Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Samaha et al., 2012; Samaha 
et al., 2015; Allini et al., 2016). The board safeguards 
stakeholder interests and prevents opportunistic 
behaviour by management through its oversight of 
corporate disclosure (Lev, 1992; Richardson and 
Welker, 2001). In this connection, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that the relationship between 
a firm’s disclosure practices and its internal control 
systems may be either complementary or 
substitutive. If the relationship is complementary, it 
can be expected that effective corporate governance 
will strengthen the firm’s internal control, and fuller 
disclosure will reduce opportunistic behaviour and 
information asymmetries. If the relationship is 
substitutive, disclosure will be more limited, as the 
internal control mechanisms are regarded as reliable 
and there is thus strong corporate governance. 
As regards board diversity, stakeholder theory 
sees managers as agents of multiple stakeholders, 
rather than shareholders alone, and considers 
diversity to be an important indicator of a firm’s 
CSR and a sign that it is stakeholder-oriented. 
Greater diversity on the board allows more open 
governance processes that ensure that stakeholder 
interests are attended to. Management must balance 
a variety of different stakeholder interests, as 
maximizing profit is not the only corporate objective 
(Hill & Jones, 1992; Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1994; Näsi, 
1995; Carroll & Buchholtz, 1996; Clarkson, 1998; 
Macey, 1998; Jensen, 2000; Oakley, 2000; Hillman et 
al., 2002; Freeman et al., 2010; Shehata, 2013). 
Based on the theoretical framework, we will 
investigate the assumption that: 
 there is a strong relationship between board 
size and the adoption of IR (RQ1/H1); 
 there is a complementary relationship 
between having foreign board members and the 
incentive for a firm to provide voluntary disclosure 
through IR (RQ1/H2); 
 there is a relationship between the number of 
foreign board members (critical mass) and IR 
adoptions (RQ2/H1); 
 there is a connection between cultural 
background (masculinity versus femininity) of 
foreign board members and IR adoptions (RQ2/H2). 
 
2.1. Foreigners 
 
Board diversity is generally measured in terms of the 
members’ range of characteristics, skills and 
backgrounds (Robinson & Dechant, 1997). Studies 
addressing diversity commonly focus on directors’ 
gender and nationality (Gul & Leung, 2004; Van der 
Zahn, 2006; Prado-Lorenzo & García-Sánchez, 2010). 
Though international board composition 
(national diversity) is rarely used as a variable in 
scholarly investigations, Heidrick and Struggles 
(2014) report that the percentage of foreign board 
members in Europe increased from 11% to 23% from 
2007 to 2009, while according to empirical research, 
national diversity is expected to increase as a result 
of globalization. 
Having foreign nationals on the board has been 
found to be associated with more extensive 
disclosure. This raises the issue of cause and effect, 
where Fields and Keys (2003) found that company 
performance is affected when individuals bring a 
variety of experiences, ideas and innovations to a 
company. 
Where foreign directors serve on the board of 
firms in developing countries, they can contribute 
the greater attention to social and environmental 
typical of their countries of origin. 
Accordingly, Ayuso and Argandona (2009) 
argue that foreign directors have an important role 
in promoting corporate social reporting strategies. 
Likewise, Khan (2010) found that the 
proportion of foreign nationals on a board is 
positively related to voluntary social disclosure by 
Bangladesh banks. Conversely, Barako and Brown 
(2008) found that the proportion of foreign 
nationals on Kenyan bank boards is not significantly 
associated with the banks’ level of corporate social 
reporting 
In this connection, a complicating factor in 
investigating the impact of subgroups (“foreigners 
on the board”, in this case), arises from critical mass 
theory (Konrad et al., 2008), which holds that this 
impact becomes significant only upon reaching a 
certain threshold, i.e., a critical mass (Kramer et al., 
2006). Failing to reach critical mass can result in 
tokenism (Kanter, 1977), as occurs when companies 
appoint a few foreign directors to the board merely 
to satisfy outside expectations (Torchia et al., 2011). 
The dominant group considers the tokens as 
stereotypes representing an entire demographic 
group. Consequently, research into the link between 
foreign directors and performance should 
distinguish between boards with one foreigner and 
boards that have reached a certain threshold. 
 
2.2. Board size 
 
The board of directors’ most important functions 
are to ratify and monitor management decisions 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). Gandia (2008) argues that 
larger boards are better able to perform these 
functions, so that management will be more 
transparent and disclose more information. Larger 
boards bring a wider range of experience and 
opinions to the firm (Adams et al., 2005), which 
increases their capacity to monitor and improves 
disclosure practices. This is borne out by empirical 
evidence presented by Cheng and Courtenay (2006) 
which indicates that voluntary disclosure increases 
with board size. Here, it should be noted that the 
corporate governance code for publicly listed firms 
in Jordan recommends that boards in the industrial 
and services sectors consist of more than five but 
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fewer than fifteen members and that boards in the 
insurance sector consist of no fewer than seven 
members (Sartawi et al., 2014). 
Some scholars, however, maintain that large 
boards have more severe agency problems, making 
their monitoring processes less effective (Yermack, 
1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; De Andrés et al., 2005). 
Gallego-Alvarez et al. (2011), on the other hand, 
believe that a large board is necessary, in that it 
provides the experience and diversity required to 
deal with complex supervisory functions and ensure 
that the information (including financial 
information) provided is accurate. Accordingly, a 
large board provides better monitoring and results 
in fuller disclosure. 
Empirical evidence is also contradictory 
regarding the relationship between the size of the 
board and information disclosure. Prado-Lorenzo 
and García-Sánchez (2010) observed a negative 
relationship, whereas Pearce and Zahra (1992), 
Dalton et al. (1999), Larmou and Vafeas (2010) and 
Izzo and Fiori (2016) observed a positive 
relationship. 
Board size has been linked to the adoption of 
integrated reporting (Rodríguez-Ariza et al., 2011) 
since IR calls for input from directors with the 
variety of viewpoints and expertise that is more 
likely to be found in larger boards. 
In addition, large boards can bring a wider 
range of perspectives to bear on the decisions made 
on behalf of investors (Schweiger et al., 1986; 
Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Kostyuk et al., 2006; 
Sakawa & Watanabel, 2007; Wang et al., 2009). 
 
2.3. Control variables 
 
This paper uses variables that have been shown to 
influence disclosure in governance studies. They 
include whether a company is listed on the stock 
market, corporate size, leverage, growth 
opportunities and profitability. Since being listed on 
the stock market encourages firms to make the 
financial, social and environmental disclosures 
which they believe the market demands, it is likely 
to improve the quality of investors’ decisions by 
reducing informational uncertainty (Ullmann, 1985). 
Being cross-listed can also affect the extent of 
disclosure, as firms traded on more than one 
exchange will often prepare their domestic accounts 
in compliance with certain aspects of foreign 
regulation. They will thus voluntarily increase their 
level of disclosure if the foreign stock market 
requirements are greater than those of their own 
domestic exchange. This has been demonstrated 
empirically by Cooke (1989), as well as by Singhvi 
and Desai (1971), Choi (1973) and Spero (1980), 
while Firth (1979) reported that listed corporations 
in the UK disclosed far more information than their 
unlisted counterparts. 
Corporate size is represented by the logarithm 
of total assets. A positive relation between corporate 
size and the volume of voluntarily disclosed data 
has been reported in the literature, e.g., by Da Silva 
Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán (2010) and Sotorrío and 
Fernández-Sánchez (2010). Some scholars have 
found that this relation is valid only up to a certain 
size (Pirchegger & Wagenhofer, 1999), while others 
do not find a statistically significant relationship 
(Khanna et al., 2004; Ortiz & Clavel, 2006). 
To represent leverage, this study relies on the 
debt-equity ratio as suggested by Ahmed and 
Courtis (1999), whose meta-analysis of 29 disclosure 
studies found it to be one of the main predictors of 
disclosure levels in corporate annual reports. 
To represent growth opportunities, the study 
relies on the firms’ sales growth to account for two-
year differences caused by high information 
asymmetry and office costs (Smith & Watts, 1992; 
Gaver & Gaver, 1993) between growing and non-
growing companies that usually release less 
information. 
Profitability is represented by return on assets 
(ROA). Although some research suggests that 
profitability has a positive influence on voluntary 
disclosure levels, most studies carried out to date 
found no statistically significant relationship 
between the two (Larrán & Giner, 2002; Giner et al., 
2003; Marston & Polei, 2004; Prencipe, 2004). 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE 
 
3.1. Sample and data 
 
To answer our RQs, companies that adopted IR (n = 
79) for 2015 according to the IIRC guidelines were 
selected from among 1,058 European companies 
from 18 different countries on the 2015 IIRC 
website. 
The comparison sample was created by 
applying a stratification sampling procedure based 
on turnover, sector, and country characteristics of 
the “population” of companies that adopted IR for 
2015. 
The Amadeus database and corporate websites 
were used to verify and double-check whether the 
content of disclosure tools was comparable to IR, 
regardless of the name actually assigned to the 
reports. 
A total of 979 companies did not adopt IR (see 
Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Sample breakdown 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
The highest IR adoption rates were in the 
United Kingdom, Spain, Netherlands and Russia (see 
Figure 2). 
 
92% 
8% 
Companies not
presenting IR
Companies
presenting IR
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Figure 2. Country breakdown of the dataset sample for companies adopting IR 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Unlisted companies accounted for 66.76% of 
the sample, with around 6% of them adopting IR as 
their disclosure document. 
 
3.2. Research methodology 
 
Because the dependent variable is binary (equal to 1 
if the company adopts IR, 0 if it does not), logistic 
regression (Logit) (Borooah, 2001; Bajari et al., 2009) 
was used to test the study’s hypotheses. 
 
3.3. Model and data processing for RQ1 
 
To answer RQ1, we used the independent variables 
(board size and foreigners) and five control variables 
(listed, size, leverage, sales growth and profitability) 
(Gujarati & Porter, 2003). 
Dependent variable: 
IR: 1 = the company adopts IR; 0 = the company 
does not adopt IR 
Independent variables: 
BOARD SIZE: Number of directors on the board 
FOREIGNERS: Percentage of foreigners on the 
board 
Control variables: 
LISTED: 1 = listed company; 0 = unlisted 
company 
SIZE: Logarithm of total assets 2015 
LEVERAGE: liabilities considered (total assets - 
equity/equity) 
SALES GROWTH: in absolute value (2015 total 
sales – 2014 total sales /2014 total sales) 
PROFITABILITY: ROA (Return on Assets) 
The logit regression equation was as follows: 
 
IR = β
0
 + β
1
 
Board Size 
+ β
2
 % 
Foreigners 
+ β
3
 
Listed 
+ β
4 Size 
+ β
5 Leverage + 
β
6 Sales Growth + 
β
7 ROA + 
µ (1) 
 
The IR dependent variable was computed in 
terms of event probability: 
 
Probability = Log (P/(1-P)) = β
0
 + β
1
 
Board Size
 + β
2
 % 
Foreigners 
+ β
3
 
Listed 
+ β
4 Size 
+ β
5 Leverage + 
β
6 Sales Growth + 
β
7 ROA + 
µ (2) 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show summary statistics for 
board composition for companies that adopt and 
who do not adopt IR. 
As can be seen from Table 1, board size in 
companies adopting IR ranges from 1 to 35 
directors, with an average of approximately 11.62 
directors. Overall, foreigner directors make up 
13.90% of the total directors. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics for companies adopting IR 
 
COMPANIES ADOPTING IR 
Board features No. Min. Max. Average Standard Deviation 
Board Size 79 1 35 11.62 8.52 
% Foreigners 79 0 100 13.90 22.36 
Listed 79 0 1 0.43 0.50 
Size 79 2.70 9.64 6.28 1.32 
Leverage 79 0.12 76.26 7.01 15.68 
Sales Growth 79 -0.38 70.71 0.98 7.95 
ROA 79 -34.01 51.12 6.64 11.42 
Listed 34     
Unlisted 45     
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
As shown in Table 2, board size in companies 
that do not adopt IR ranges from 1 to 57 directors, 
with an average of approximately 10.65 directors. 
Overall, foreigner directors make up 16.29% of the 
total directors. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics for companies not adopting IR 
 
COMPANIES NOT ADOPTING IR 
Board features No. Min. Max. Average Standard Deviation 
Board Size 979 1 57 10,65 8.88 
% Foreigners 979 0 100 16,29 24.47 
Listed 979 0 1 0.33 0.470 
Size 979 2.52 11.65 6.73 0.77 
Leverage 979 0 105.49 7.47 12.97 
Sales Growth 979 -0.99 475.58 11.44 33.22 
ROA 979 -77.47 91.58 4.72 10.80 
Listed 321     
Unlisted 658     
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics for the whole sample 
 
SUMMARY (average values) COMPANIES ADOPTING IR COMPANIES NOT ADOPTING IR WHOLE SAMPLE 
Board Size 11.62 10.65 10.72 
% Foreigners 13.90 16.29 16.11 
Listed 0.43 0.33 0.34 
Size 6.28 6.73 6.70 
Leverage 7.01 7.47 7.44 
Sales Growth 0.98 11.44 10.67 
ROA 6.64 4.72 4.86 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
3.4. Model and data processing for RQ2 
 
For RQ2, we selected companies with at least one 
foreign director, obtaining a set of 506 firms, 40 of 
which adopt IR. 
Dependent variable: 
IR: 1 = the company adopts IR; 0 = the company 
does not adopt IR 
Independent variables: 
CRITICAL MASS: 1 = the company has more 
than three foreign directors; 0 = the company has 
fewer than three foreign directors 
COUNTRY CULTURE: 3 = the majority of foreign 
directors are from feminine countries; 2 = the 
majority of foreign directors come from masculine 
countries; 1 = no prevalence 
HIGH ADOPTION RATE: 1 = at least one foreign 
director comes from the United Kingdom, Spain, 
Netherlands and Russia; 0 = director(s) from other 
countries 
Control variables: 
LISTED: 1 = listed company; 0 = unlisted 
company 
SIZE: Logarithm of total assets 2015 
LEVERAGE: liabilities considered (total assets - 
equity/equity) 
SALES GROWTH: in absolute value (2015 total 
sales - 2014 total sales /2014 total sales) 
PROFITABILITY: ROA (Return on Assets) 
The logit regression equation was as follows: 
 
IR = β
0
 + β
1
 
Critical Mass
 + β
2
 
Country culture 
+ β
3
 
High adoption rate
 + β
4
 
Listed 
+ β
5 Size 
+ β
6 Leverage + 
β
7 Sales Growth + 
β
8 ROA + 
µ (3) 
 
The IR dependent variable was computed in 
terms of event probability: 
 
Probability = Log (P/(1-P)) = β
0
 + β
1
 
Critical Mass
 + β
2
 
Country culture 
+ β
3
 
High adoption rate 
+ β
4
 
Listed 
+ β
5 Size 
+ β
6 Leverage + 
β
7 Sales 
Growth + 
β
8 ROA + 
µ 
(4) 
 
Tables 4 and 5 show summary statistics for 
board composition for companies with at least one 
foreign director that adopt and who do not adopt IR. 
Overall, there are 506 companies with at least one 
foreign director, 266 of which have more than three 
foreign directors. 
 
Table 4. Summary statistics for companies adopting IR 
 
COMPANIES ADOPTING IR 
 No. Min. Max. Average Standard Deviation 
Critical Mass 40 0 1 0.68 0.474 
Country Culture 40 1 3 2.53 0.679 
High adoption rate 40 0 1 0.73 0.452 
Listed 40 0 1 0.45 0.504 
Size 40 4.63 9.64 6.89 1.020 
Leverage 40 0.20 49.21 3.167 7.703 
Sales Growth 40 -0.37 0.22 0.017 0.148 
ROA 40 -11.21 51.12 6.64 7.802 
Listed 18     
Unlisted 22     
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table 5. Summary statistics for companies not adopting IR 
 
COMPANIES NOT ADOPTING IR 
 No. Min. Max. Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Critical Mass 466 0 1 0.24 0.425 
Country Culture 466 1 3 2.05 0.554 
High adoption rate 466 0 1 0.26 0.439 
Listed 466 0 1 0.42 0.495 
Size 466 3.31 11.65 6.92 0.719 
Leverage 466 0.04 94.58 7.26 12.88 
Sales Growth 466 -0.63 475.58 1.21 22.09 
ROA 466 -34.75 91.58 4.99 9.416 
Listed 198     
Unlisted 268     
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 6. Summary statistics for the whole sample 
 
SUMMARY (average values) COMPANIES ADOPTING IR COMPANIES NOT ADOPTING IR WHOLE SAMPLE 
Critical Mass 0.68 0.24 0.27 
Country Culture 2.53 2.05 2.09 
High adoption rate 0.73 0.26 0.30 
Listed 0.45 0.42 0.43 
Size 6.89 6.92 6.92 
Leverage 3.17 7.26 6.93 
Sales Growth 0.02 1.21 1.12 
ROA 6.64 4.99 5.21 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The results of the research are substantially in line 
with the theoretical framework presented in section 
2 (Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013; García-Sánchez et al., 
2013; Samaha et al., 2015; Allini et al., 2016; Izzo & 
Fiori, 2016). 
 
4.1. Findings for RQ1 
 
Bivariate analysis was used to assess the correlation 
between independent variables, giving a maximum 
Spearman correlation coefficient (r) of 0.314. 
Coefficients are significant at different confidence 
levels. 
The model’s Cox-Snell R-square is 0.031. On the 
other hand, the Chi-square test is statistically 
significant (Chi2 = 33.29, ρ = 0.000), meaning that 
the model explains nearly 99% of the variation in 
sampled firms’ voluntary disclosure. As the variance 
inflation factors for all variables are between 1.007 
and 1.219, it can be concluded that the model is not 
affected by multicollinearity problems. 
The most significant variables are: Size and 
listed. 
Bivariate correlations for the variables used in 
the model are summarized in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Bivariate correlations 
 
  
REPORT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Board Size .029 
       
2 % Foreigners -.026 .088** 
      
3 Listed .057 .399** .054 
     
4 Corporate Size -.142** .314** .167** .245** 
    
5 Leverage -.009 -.130** .034 -.171** -.019 
   
6 Sales Growth -.009 -.036 -.018 -.023 -.042 .033 
  
7 ROA .046 .033 -.005 .029 -.027 -.071* -.017 
 
Note:  ** Correlation is significant at level 0.01 (two-tailed) 
 * Correlation is significant at level 0.05 (two-tailed) 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
As Table 8 shows, the size of the board of 
directors is positively related to IR adoption (β
1 
= 
.023), indicating that the board’s monitoring 
capacity increases along with the number of 
directors on it, and disclosure levels grow. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1 (RQ1) is supported. 
Table 8 also shows that the coefficient of % 
Foreigners is negative and insignificant (β
2 
= -.001). 
Thus, Hypothesis 2 (RQ1) is not supported. 
 
Table 8. Logistic regression results (Logit) 
 
 
B S.E. Wald gl Sign. Exp(B) 
Board Size 0.023 0.014 2.598 1 0.107 1.023 
% Foreigners -0.001 0.005 0.045 1 0.832 0.999 
Listed 0.670 0.270 6.160 1 0.013 1.954 
Corporate Size -0.725 0.136 28.537 1 0.000 0.484 
Leverage 0.000 0.001 0.043 1 0.836 1.000 
Sales Growth 0.000 0.002 0.034 1 0.854 1.000 
ROA 0.011 0.009 1.597 1 0.206 1.011 
Constant 1.662 0.807 4.241 1 0.039 5.272 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Logit results were then transformed in 
probability terms. In other words, the probability of 
adopting IR compared to the average value was 
calculated for each independent variable, and 
variations were then determined in terms of 
probability following an increase or decrease in the 
average value of these variables. 
For each variable, Figure 3 shows the variation 
in the probability of adopting IR as board 
characteristics vary. 
 
Figure 3. Probability of adopting IR versus independent variables 
 
 
Legend: Black: average value; Grey: increase compared the average value; Light Grey: decrease compared the average value. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
These results show that companies with a 
larger board of directors are 1.023 times more likely 
to adopt IR than companies with a smaller board, 
Exp(B) = 1.023. Boards with ten members have a 
likelihood of 86.90% of adopting IR as the firm’s 
disclosure tool, while one additional board member 
increases the likelihood by 0.52%. 
Adding foreigners to the board decreases the 
probability that a company will adopt IR (odds 
ratio = 0.999). Companies, where 16% of the board 
are foreigners, record an 83.83% probability of 
adopting IR, and this decreases by 0.27% following a 
10% rise in the number of foreign board members. 
 
4.2. Findings for RQ2 
 
Here again, bivariate analysis was used to assess the 
correlation between independent variables, giving a 
maximum Spearman correlation coefficient (r) of 
0.275. Coefficients are significant at different 
confidence levels. 
The model’s Cox-Snell R-square is 0.142. On the 
other hand, the Chi-square test is (Chi2 = 77.61, ρ = 
0.000), meaning that the model explains nearly 99% 
of the variation in sampled firms’ voluntary 
disclosure. As the variance inflation factors for all 
variables are between 1.012 and 1.128, it can be 
concluded that the model is not affected by 
multicollinearity problems.  
The most significant variables are Critical Mass 
and High Adoption Rate. 
Bivariate correlations for the variables used in 
the model are summarized in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Bivariate correlations 
 
  
REPORT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Critical Mass .267** 
        
2 Country Culture .221** .206** 
       
3 High Adoption Rate .275** .267** .162** 
      
4 Listed 0.014 -0.004 -0.008 -0.027 
     
5 Size -0.012 .134** .105* 0.054 -0.053 
    
6 Leverage -0.016 -0.028 -0.008 0.066 -0.041 0.01 
   
7 Sales Growth -0.015 -0.028 -0.006 0.067 -0.036 -0.059 -0.002 
  
8 ROA 0.079 0.017 0.006 0.041 0.013 -0.048 -0.073 -0.006 
 
** Correlation is significant at level 0.01 (two-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at level 0.05 (two-tailed) 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 10 shows a positive relationship between 
Critical Mass and IR adoption (β
1 
= 1.441). 
This means that boards with more than three 
foreign directors are more likely to adopt IR. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1 (RQ2) is supported. 
Table 10 also shows a positive relationship 
with the dependent variable Country Culture 
(β
2 
= 1.220). In countries with a feminine culture, 
there is a greater tendency to use this disclosure 
tool. Thus, Hypothesis 2 (RQ2) is supported. 
The high adoption rate is also positively related 
(β
3
 = 1.597), meaning that firms with directors from 
countries showing the highest IR adoption rates in 
Europe in 2015 are more likely to use this type of 
reporting. 
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Table 10. Logistic regression results (Logit) 
 
 
B S.E. Wald gl Sign. Exp(B) 
Critical Mass 1.441 0.396 13.255 1 0.000 4.224 
Country Culture 1.220 0.344 12.559 1 0.000 3.386 
High Adoption Rate 1.597 0.397 16.203 1 0.000 4.936 
Listed 0.115 0.378 0.093 1 0.760 1.122 
Size -0.329 0.237 1.932 1 0.165 0.719 
Leverage -0.056 0.037 2.383 1 0.123 0.945 
Sales Growth -1.234 1.092 1.278 1 0.258 0.291 
ROA 0.026 0.016 2.592 1 0.107 1.026 
Constant -4.309 1.810 5.671 1 0.017 0.013 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Logit results were then transformed into 
probability terms. In other words, the probability of 
adopting IR compared to the average value was 
calculated for each independent variable, and 
variations were then determined in terms of 
probability following an increase or decrease in the 
average value of these variables. 
For each variable, the graphs below show the 
variation in the probability of adopting IR as board 
characteristics vary. 
 
Figure 4. Probability of adopting IR versus independent variables 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
These results show that companies with more 
than three foreign directors are 4 times more likely 
to adopt IR than companies with fewer foreign 
directors, Exp(B) = 4.22. 
The model indicates that when directors come 
from countries with a feminine culture, the 
probability of adopting IR is 3.39 higher 
Exp(B) = 3.38. These companies have 34% probability 
of adopting IR. The probability that companies will 
adopt IR is 4.9 times higher when directors come 
from countries with high adoption rates (United 
Kingdom, Spain, Netherlands and Russia), 
Exp(B) = 4.94. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
A deeper understanding of the factors influencing 
the decision to adopt IR is essential for academics, 
companies and – especially – policy-makers, 
considering that this kind of disclosure supports 
integrated thinking and improves the quality of 
information available to the providers of financial 
capital. 
This study offers new insight into the 
relationship between board diversity, in terms of 
nationality, and the decision to adopt IR, which is an 
efficient means of communicating with stakeholders 
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and measuring a company’s social sustainability and 
economic growth in the medium and long-term. 
The study examined 1,058 European companies 
from different countries appearing on the IIRC 
website in 2015. 
The results indicated a positive relationship 
between adopting IR and the size of the board of 
directors and a negative link with the percentage of 
foreign board members. 
To better understand this negative relationship, 
other factors that influence nationality diversity 
were introduced. 
Among these factors, it was found that having 
a critical mass of foreign board members influences 
a firm’s decision to adopt IR, as do having directors 
from countries with high IR adoption rates and 
feminine cultures. 
Some limitations of this research are 
represented by: 
 Other variables capturing different aspects 
other than corporate governance could be included; 
 Different factors, such as strategy decisions, 
communication policies and regulatory/legal 
backgrounds, could be considered. 
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